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Abstract  
Debates around sound corporate governance propose board diversity as a key attribute to 
sufficiently challenge executive management for stakeholder engagement. This study 
contributes to this debate by empirically investigating the effect of board diversity on 
corporate social disclosure (CSD) of Vietnamese listed firms. The study finds a significantly 
positive effect of diversity-in-boards (dissimilarities among directors within a board, i.e., 
demographic attributes of board members) on CSD while diversity-of-boards (dissimilarities 
among firm boards, i.e., board structure) has no effect on CSD. The results contribute by 
showing that a single theoretical approach can provide an adequate explanation for board  
diversity. The study contributes methodologically by demonstrating the design and 
measurement of board diversity indices, and a three-dimensional stakeholder-relevant CSD 
index. The findings benefit regulators and corporate executives in better understanding firms’ 
CSD practices and stakeholders’ expectations. 
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Introduction 
A board of directors is the cornerstone of corporate governance frameworks. There are 
numerous factors that signify various dimensions of a board, and board diversity is one of the 
most important (Kang et al. 2007, Milliken and Martins 1996). The breadth of factors relating 
to board diversity make it difficult to define the term explicitly (Harrison and Klein 2007). 
Several scholars have examined the implications of board diversity in relation to firm’s 
outcomes by defining it operationally (Hafsi and Turgut 2013). Some studies refer to board 
diversity as a demographic phenomenon entailing age, gender, and ethnicity, while others 
refer to board diversity as a structural phenomenon comprising CEO duality, board 
independence, and director ownership. Hafsi and Turgut’s (2013) study differs from prior 
studies in approaching the factors of board diversity from both dimensions. They classify 
factors relating to the demographic phenomenon as a diversity-in-boards index, and factors 
relating to the structural phenomenon as a diversity-of-boards index.  
Although such stakeholder scrutiny is much stronger in developed nations, recent 
empirical studies have shown an increasing trend of corporate social responsibility disclosure 
in developing countries (Haji 2013). Despite this welcome trend, studies in both developed 
and developing countries have mainly focused on disclosure quantity (Ho and Wong 2001, 
Xiao and Yuan 2007), and a limited number of empirical studies have investigated disclosure 
quality (Haji 2013). To combine disclosure quantity and disclosure quality, this study 
measures corporate social disclosure (CSD) using three dimensions which combine disclosure 
quantity and two aspects of disclosure quality from the stakeholder perspective: the quality of 
the items disclosed and the quality of the types of disclosure about CSD, as perceived by 
stakeholders. 
This investigation is especially pertinent to developing countries, where the understanding 
of CSD practices is still poor because such practices are perceived as philanthropic activities. 
Bui (2010) also shows that in the past Vietnamese firms have paid little attention to CSD for 
three main reasons: the firms do not understand disclosure impacts on society, and lack both 
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financial resources and an enforcing legal framework. These factors have discouraged firms 
from adopting CSD in their corporate policies. While international economic integration has 
helped Vietnamese businesses to expand their activities globally, they have been also facing 
important issues for sustainable development, especially relating to society and the 
environment. Recent scandals concerning serious factory-generated pollution of the Thi-Vai 
river and various health safety cases such as tainted milk distribution, toxic ingredients in 
consumer goods, and pesticide residue in vegetables have resulted in a greater concern for 
social responsibility in Vietnam. Along with these environmental and health issues, 
Vietnamese export companies have been also encountering issues relating to certification and 
standards when their foreign investors and buyers require them to adopt business practices 
based on respect for people, communities and the environment. For example, the U.S.–
Vietnam textiles agreement of 2003 included an obligation for the Vietnamese authorities to 
encourage exporting companies to implement corporate social responsibility codes in the U.S. 
and disclose about them in return for access to the U.S. market. Additionally, Vietnam’s ten-
year Socio-Economic Development Plan (2011–2020) shows the beginnings of a policy focus 
on structural reforms, environmental sustainability, social equity, and macro-economic 
stability (World Bank 2015).   
It is proposed that board diversity can help challenge management to show responsibility 
beyond shareholders (CIMA 2011). This is pertinent to a country such as Vietnam, as 
explosive economic growth propelled by Vietnamese firms can also bring social problems. In 
spite of an increasing awareness of CSD among Vietnamese firms recently, there has not been 
any research that has examined the effect of board diversity on CSD in Vietnamese listed 
firms.  
As adopted by Strand (1983), corporate social performance refers to a firm’s anticipated 
or existing social demands, and corporate social disclosures are disclosures about these 
demands. Importantly, this study does not equate CSD with social performance, the locus of a 
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great debate in the literature (Ullmann 1985). We focus here on CSD in annual reports rather 
than on social performance because CSD, similar to earnings, is easily spotted (Yip et al., 
2011). Annual reports are the main public document and are regularly produced to 
communicate corporate review, whereas measuring social performance, especially in 
developing countries like Vietnam, is difficult because there is no database from which to 
elicit information about such performance. In addition, in the absence of formalized social 
performance information in databases, and given that measuring social performance requires 
measuring from several dimensions, manual measurement can lead to higher margins of error 
(Yip et al. 2011).  
1. Literature review 
Recent research has shown that CSD brings firms greater utility. Cheng, Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2014) and Ioannou and Serafeim (2015) find that firms with better CSD have lower 
capital constraints and better access to finance. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) show that firms 
experience a decrease in cost of equity capital after issuing a CSR report.  Dhaliwal et al. 
(2012) find that the issuance of stand-alone CSR reports is associated with lower analyst 
forecast error. Brammer and Pavelin (2008) document that environmental disclosure eases 
legislative pressures and brings economic benefits in the future (Matsumura et al. 2014). 
A large number of studies on the relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
disclosure have been done around the world. For example, Chen and Jaggi (2000) find a 
positive relation between board independence and voluntary disclosure of Hong Kong listed 
firms. In contrast, in Singapore, Eng and Mak (2003) find that an increase in outside directors 
decreases corporate disclosure. Unlike these findings, Matolcsy et al. (2012) show that there 
is no association between board composition and certain types of disclosure of Australian 
Stock Exchange listed firms. The mixed findings of studies show that country-specific factors 
may moderate the association between corporate governance and corporate disclosure. 
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Previous studies have also mainly examined the effect of isolated factors concerning the 
structure of the board of directors, on corporate social responsibility or corporate social 
performance (Haniffa and Cooke 2005, Naser et al. 2006, Prado-Lorenzo et al. 2009), and 
have produced mixed findings. Some studies find that independent directors are positively 
related to corporate social responsibility disclosure (Lattemann et al. 2009, Webb 2004). 
Others find a negative relationship (Haniffa and Cooke 2005). Still others find no association 
(Cormier et al. 2011, Michelon and Parbonetti 2012). Another feature of prior studies is that 
they primarily investigate factors to do with the board of directors’ demographic dimensions 
in isolation. In particular, they have been mainly about gender diversity impacting on 
corporate social responsibility disclosure. Corporate social responsibility or corporate social 
performance in these studies is measured based on the available databases such as the FTSE4 
Good Global Index, KLD, KEJI Index, and SiRi Pro
TM
. These studies however bring 
important revelations. For instance, they show that female directors positively influence 
charitable giving (Wang and Coffey 1992, Williams 2003), as well as safe and healthy work 
environments (Bernardi et al. 2006, Johnson and Greening 1999).  
In this context, Hafsi and Turgut (2013) make a vital contribution to understanding board 
diversity. Examining the influence of board diversity from two dimensions on the social 
performance of firms listed on S&P 500, they discover that diversity-in-boards is statistically 
significant and positively related to social performance, and that diversity-of-boards does not 
significantly influence social performance.  
There is only one study (Vu et al. 2011) that has investigated the influence of corporate 
governance on voluntary disclosures, including social disclosure, in Vietnam. Looking at 45 
Vietnamese listed firms in 2008, that study uses the percentage of independent directors as a 
proxy measure for corporate governance, and measures the disclosure quantity. Controlling 
for the influence that ownership structure can have on voluntary disclosures, Vu et al. (2011) 
find low disclosure levels among Vietnamese listed firms. They also find that state ownership 
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in firms negatively influences social disclosure, but managerial ownership positively 
influences disclosure. Additionally, larger firms are positively associated with voluntary 
disclosure. 
This study embraces the dichotomous classification of the diversity of the board of 
directors adopted by Hafsi and Turgut (2013). However, this study contextualizes the 
attributes of diversity-in-boards and diversity-of-boards to Vietnam, an emerging market. This 
is done on the basis that prior research concludes that governance structures probably develop 
endogeneity depending on firm-specific characteristics and the unique business environment 
in a particular country (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2006, Haniffa and Hudaib 2006, Love 2011). 
Further, this study first assumes that attributes of board diversity are of equal importance 
(unweighted method), and then assigns unequal importance to measure diversity-in-boards 
and diversity-of-boards indices. The weights are based on the responses received from a 
survey questionnaire answered by listed firms’ executives on the relative importance of these 
attributes in relation to CSD. A comparison of results between these two measurement 
methods (weighted and unweighted) allows this study to investigate the potential impact of 
the perceived importance of attributes relating to the diversity-in-boards and diversity-of-
boards and their relationship with CSD. Therefore, this study extends Hafsi and Turgut’s 
(2013) and Vu et al.’s (2011) studies while examining the influence of board diversity on 
CSD in Vietnam. 
2. Theoretical framework  
Resource dependence theory and agency theory are two organizational theories that underpin 
how board diversity influences CSD (Bear et al. 2010). Although Bear et al. (2010) use these 
theories to investigate the impact of board diversity on corporate social responsibility ratings, 
not disclosure, prior studies show a link between corporate social responsibility ratings and 
disclosure. For example, Gelb and Strawser (2001) find that firms with higher corporate 
social responsibility ratings provide more extensive disclosures, suggesting that corporate 
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social responsibility reports published by firms reflect corporate social responsibility 
performance. Similarly, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) also show that firms with better corporate 
social responsibility performance are more likely to  disclose  their  corporate social 
responsibility activities to the market. 
Board diversity is presented as both fiduciary and advisory in nature. These roles may 
affect CSD differently. From the fiduciary perspective, agency theory offers an intention of 
the board of directors to monitor managerial actions affecting shareholders (Fama and Jensen 
1983). This monitoring role ensures that the interest of managers aligns with that of 
shareholders, including minority shareholders (Fama 1980, Fama and Jensen 1983). The key 
aim of the board of directors’ fiduciary duty is to minimize agency costs. Since monitoring is 
a fiduciary function of the board, how effectively a board monitors whether managers act to 
serve their self-interest rather than the interests of the shareholders they represent can differ 
between boards. 
From the advisory perspective of governance, the diversity among board members within 
a firm is a resource firms depend on for good governance (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
Resource dependence theory shows that improving social relationships is likely to result in 
economic returns for a firm (Hafsi and Turgut 2013). Resource dependence theory suggests 
that the board of directors is a resource for a firm, comprising expertise, advice, reputation, 
and information networks that the directors bring to the firm (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). 
Diversity among board members can engage responsibility towards society as well as towards 
shareholders, as some directors can introduce values such as economic development being 
concomitant with moral development (Boyd 1990, Labelle et al. 2010).  
3.1 Research hypotheses 
The structural attributes of the board are vital to corporate governance practices (Haniffa and 
Cooke 2002) and can influence the disclosures made in annual reports of the firm (Haniffa 
and Cooke 2005). Using the proposition of agency theory, the structural attributes of a board 
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can offer a guarantee that the board will fulfill its fiduciary function by aligning firms goals 
with the stakeholder interests (Fama and Jensen 1983, Haniffa and Cooke 2005). Such 
alignment can enhance reporting transparency and can lead to high-quality dissemination of 
social information.  Based on this perspective, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: Higher diversity-of-boards leads to higher CSD. 
Prior studies mostly find a positive relationship between women in the boardroom and 
social performance (e.g., Boulouta 2013, Williams 2003) or social disclosure (e.g., Galbreath 
2011). Hafsi and Turgut (2013) find that diversity-in-boards significantly and positively 
associates with social performance. Using the proposition of resource dependence theory, 
diversity among directors in a firm is a necessary resource for a firm to realize and respond to 
the impact of its activities on the environment (Boyd 1990). That realization can assist the 
firm in addressing CSD issues and adopting appropriate disclosure practices. In line with prior 
findings and resource dependence theory, this research argues that diversity-in-boards leads to 
CSD relevant to stakeholders. The following hypothesis is therefore stated. 
Hypothesis 2: Higher diversity-in-boards leads to higher CSD. 
3. Methodology 
4.1 Measuring CSD  
Content analysis has been used extensively in examining firms’ voluntary disclosure 
(Abeysekera and Guthrie 2005, Haniffa and Cooke 2005), and is used in this study to examine 
the extent of CSD in annual reports.  
In analyzing the annual report content of Vietnamese firms, one author coded all the 
annual reports for the social information to ensure consistent and valid data collection. This 
was repeated after two weeks by the same author (Haji 2013, Weetman and Ghazali 2006) to 
establish intra-rater reliability. As a second step to establish inter-rater reliability, another 
author coded ten randomly selected annual reports and found no significant difference 
between the two coders. It should be noted that reliability of content analysis can be achieved 
9 
 
through having multiple coders, or alternatively by having a single coder assign the scores 
and then take some additional time to review the assigned scores (Neuendorf, 2002, Haji 
2013). Additionally, Milne and Adler (1999) explain that there are several different ways to 
measure reliability, and there is no single criterion of adequate reliability within any of these 
methods. 
This study uses the social indicators section in the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 3.1 
framework to measure CSD. The framework is versatile across firms and geographies. 
Currently, the GRI framework is extensively used to assess and measure Sustainability 
Reporting, including CSD (Hopkins 2012). The social indicators in the GRI 3.1 index are 
classified into four vital performance aspects: product responsibility, society, human rights, 
and labor practices. The items in the index include 15 labor practices indicators (LA1 to 
LA15), 11 human rights indicators (HR1 to HR11), 10 society indicators (SO1 to SO10), and 
9 product responsibility indicators (PR1 to PR9). These GRI framework items are used to 
obtain information about CSD from annual reports (Adams 2002). 
4.2 Measuring disclosure quantity 
This study measures disclosure quantity, by assigning “1” if an item is present in the annual 
report, otherwise zero. This binary coding is consistent with CSD studies of firms in emerging 
nations (Haji 2013, Haniffa and Cooke 2005, Khan et al. 2013).  
4.3 Measuring disclosed item quality and disclosed type quality  
Using the binary approach to measure disclosure quantity has been criticized for assuming all 
disclosure items are equally important (Barako et al. 2006). Lu and Abeysekera (2014) 
overcome that assumption by combining the importance of disclosure items and the 
importance of disclosure types into disclosure quantity, in examining social and 
environmental disclosure. They ascertain the importance of disclosure items (i.e., disclosed 
item quality) and disclosure types (i.e., disclosed type quality) by questioning 12 stakeholders, 
and assign weights accordingly. Following the approach initiated by Lu and Abeysekera 
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(2014), this study obtains perceptions from 652 stakeholders about the importance of 
disclosed items.  
This study conducts a survey of stakeholders to obtain their perspectives on disclosure 
type preference (i.e., monetary quantification, numerical quantification, narrative, or both 
monetary and numerical) (Guthrie and Parker 1990), and the importance of reporting items 
(i.e., items in the social indicators of GRI 3.1). If the same item is disclosed more than once 
with different types, an average score is computed to allow each item to contribute once to the 
overall results.  
This study prepared four different questionnaire versions for four different stakeholder 
groups, and the questionnaires were hand delivered to respondents. The employee 
questionnaire (labor stakeholders) asked about labor practices. The customer questionnaire 
(product stakeholders) invited responses on aspects of product responsibility. The local 
communities questionnaire (society stakeholders) asked members of local communities about 
societal aspects. The social equity questionnaire asked lawyers and regulators (human rights 
stakeholders) to respond about human rights aspects. These  groups of users were selected 
based on  their  likely  differences  of  interest  on  social  issues,  aligning with the range of 
expectations set out in the GRI 3.1, as follows. The product responsibility indicators address 
the aspects of a reporting organization’s products and services that directly  affect  customers.  
The  society  indicators  focus  attention  on  the  impact  that organizations  have  on  local  
communities.  Labor  practices indicators  act as a dialogue between the company and its 
employees, and the degree to which employees are organized in representative bodies.  
Human rights indicators require  organizations  to  report  on  the  extent  to  which  processes  
have  been implemented,  on  incidents  of  human  rights  violations,  and  on  changes  in  
the stakeholders’  ability  to  enjoy  and  exercise  their  human  rights  during  the  reporting 
period. Lawyers and regulators were included to encompass this aspect. 
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The literature notes that shareholders are considered one of the most important 
stakeholder groups regarding CSD (Aerts et al. 2007, 2008, Berthelot et al. 2012, Clarkson et 
al. 2013, Cormier et al. 2011, Dhaliwal et al. 2011, Dhaliwal et al. 2012, Ioannou & Serafeim 
2014). The four stakeholder groups selected for the survey, however, did not include 
shareholders, consistent with the GRI 3.1 framework adopted in this study where shareholder 
interest is not separately identified but is posited to be in all stakeholder groups.  
The questionnaire used in the study has a scale of zero (unimportant) to 10 (the most 
important), making it an 11-point scale. A wide scale increases the variance of responses 
obtained and makes the results more reliable (Dawes 2002, Hartley and Betts 2010). The 
stakeholder-specific groups were requested to rate each item from zero to 10 based on their 
perceptions of how important the item was to them and how the items should be disclosed. In 
relation to how an item should be disclosed, they evaluated four disclosure types (i.e., 
narrative, monetary quantification, numerical quantification, both monetary and numerical) 
for each item using a zero-to-10 rating scale. 
The weight for a particular item is computed by the total of the integer values assigned to 
the item and then divided by the number of individuals who responded to the item. Similarly, 
the level of importance for each type (i.e., narrative, monetary quantification, numerical 
quantification, both monetary and numerical) of a particular item is calculated by the total of 
the integer values assigned to each particular type of disclosure for each item and then divided 
by the number of respondents for this type. A mean score is used to summarize the response 
scores within a specific stakeholder group.  
4.4 The stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index 
The CSD in this research is driven by stakeholders and has three dimensions. The three 
dimensions are combined to develop a CSD index. The CSD index of a firm is computed 
according to the following equation: 
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max( )
n
i i i
i
j
i
Quantity xItemQuality xTypeQuality
CSD
SCORE


 (1) 
where CSDj = a stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional index of firm j; Quantityi = the 
disclosure or non-disclosure of an item i with regard to this item’s disclosure type in firm j; 
ItemQualityi = the weight of the item i disclosed; TypeQualityi = the weight for the type (i.e., 
narrative, monetary quantification, numerical quantification, or both monetary and numerical) 
of the item i disclosed; n = the number of items within the checklist; max(SCORE) = the 
highest score of three disclosed dimensions for a specified firm: disclosed quantity score x 
disclosed item quality score x disclosed type quality score. 
4.5 Measures of board diversity 
Four board diversity indices are constructed to measure board diversity: an unweighted 
diversity-of-boards index (UW_DoB), an unweighted diversity-in-boards index (UW_DiB), a 
weighted diversity-of-boards index (W_DoB), and a weighted diversity-in-boards index 
(W_DiB).  
The unweighted board diversity indices (UW_DoB and UW_DiB) are constructed based 
on the guidance provided by Hafsi and Turgut (2013). The diversity indices combine several 
attributes of the board either relating to the structure (DOB) or relating to directors in the 
board (DIB), with equal weights assigned to them. Since assigning equal importance to each 
attribute is hypothetical (Ben-Amar et al. 2013), this study constructs two additional board 
diversity indices that are weighted (W_DoB and W_DiB). The weights are based on the 
responses received from a survey questionnaire answered by listed firms’ executives. 
4.5.1 Unweighted diversity-of-boards index  
This study includes four structural attributes relating to the board, to construct the diversity-
of-boards indices. Table 1 describes these measures. 
Table 1. Description and composition of independent variables (diversity indices). 
Variables  Measurement  
Independent variables: diversity-of-boards indices 
CEO/chair separation 0 if the chairperson also serves as the CEO and 1 otherwise. 
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Non-executive directors owning 
more than 5% of a firm’s equity 
(blockholders) 
1 if there is more than one non-executive director who also 
serves as a blockholder and 0 otherwise. 
Representative directors’ ownership The percentage of state ownership represented by directors. 
Promoters The number of inside directors also serving as representative 
directors for government divided by the number of directors. 
 
Independent variables: diversity-in-boards indices 
Director gender Using modified Blau’s index with a classification of male and 
female directors. 
Director age Using modified Blau’s index with a classification of five 
subgroupings: under 36 years, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, and over 
65.
 
Director education degree Using modified Blau’s index with a classification of four 
subgroupings: PhD, master’s, bachelor’s and others. 
Director nationality Using modified Blau’s index with a classification of foreign 
and domestic directors. 
 
This study constructs UW_DoB using the cluster analysis method (Han and Kamber 
2006) as employed in previous studies (Deza and Deza 2009, Hafsi and Turgut 2013). This 
measurement represents dissimilarity among firm boards using the structural attributes of the 
board, and shows the extent to which all four structural attributes of the board in a given firm 
board are dissimilar from those of other firm boards in the sample.  
Three main steps are used to ascertain the extent to which a board is dissimilar from the 
remaining boards. First, a matrix is developed by measuring the dissimilarity between a given 
firm and other firms, for each structural attribute of the board. Second, the extent of 
dissimilarity between a given firm and the other firms on all structural attributes (i.e., four 
attributes in this study) of the board is calculated. Third, the average dissimilarity between a 
given firm and the remaining firms in the sample is generated. This becomes the UW_DoB of 
the given firm.  
The structural attributes of boards in this study contain binary and ratio scale data types. 
Han and Kamber (2006) have shown how to measure inter-sample differences with different 
data types, and their approach is accordingly used here to quantify the inter-sample 
differences. This method lumps together several attributes in a single dissimilarity matrix and 
uses a standardized range with differences from 0 to 1 for all the attributes. Each attribute in a 
given firm is measured and compared to the same attribute in the remaining firms in the 
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sample. If the measurement value is different, then that attribute value is recorded as different, 
and receives a score of more than zero; otherwise it is zero. Each attribute in a given firm is 
compared in this way. A higher scale represents higher diversity-of-boards. The details of this 
method are given in the Appendix. 
 
4.5.2 Unweighted diversity-in-boards index 
Table 2 describes the measurement of four demographic attributes of the board of directors to 
illustrate how demographic attributes are diverse among directors within a board representing 
a firm (gender, age, educational qualifications, and nationality). Each of these attributes is 
first measured using Blau’s index (1977). Blau’s index is recommended as an optimal method 
to measure dissimilarities within a group (Harrison and Klein 2007). This index is computed 
as follows: 
  21 ( )np  (2) 
where n = 1, …, N possible categories, and p is the percentage of members of the board of 
directors in the n
th
 category. When Blau’s index gains a large value, diversity-in-boards 
increases. However, in order to obtain a standardized range from zero to unity for all 
demographic diversity attributes, the method introduced by Agresti and Agresti (1978) is 
used. In this method, Blau’s index is multiplied by  N/(N-1) to create what is termed a 
modified Blau’s index. Then, to construct UW_DiB, the sample is split into terciles for each 
attribute to rank the levels of diversity (Ben-Amar et al. 2013, Hafsi and Turgut 2013). These 
groups then take values of 0 for the first tercile, 1 for the second, and 2 for the third. Finally, 
UW_DiB is the sum of all the ranked attributes that are involved in the demographic diversity 
within a board for each firm, such that a higher value represents a higher diversity-in-boards. 
 
4.5.3 Weighted diversity-of-boards and weighted diversity-in-boards indices 
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This study constructs a weighted diversity-of-boards index (W_DoB) and weighted diversity-
in-boards index (W_DiB) similar to UW_DoB and UW_DiB, using each attribute relating to 
the board structure and to directors within a board. These attributes are weighted based on 
executives’ perceptions on their relative importance (Dess and Davis 1984, Van der Walt et 
al. 2006).
3
 The corporate executives of Vietnamese listed firms have an experiential 
understanding of how keen the directors in a board are to enhance the quality of earnings and 
CSD. Hence, the survey asked executives to assign a value to each attribute of directors 
within a board towards impacting on CSD of their firm. Each attribute is assigned a value 
ranging from zero (unimportant) to 10 (most important). The questionnaire was sent to 150 
executives of all the firms in the sample. There were 80 usable responses, representing 
53.33% of the sample. 
This study calculates 
( )f
ij in Equation (3) for each attribute to construct a weighted 
diversity-of-boards index (W_DoB) for each firm using the following formula:  
  



( )
1
* ff
ij p
ff
p MEANRATING
MEANRATING
 
 (3)  
where 
( )f
ij is the indicator of attribute f weighted; p is the number of attributes f; and 
MEANRATING is the mean importance rating of each attribute f based on executives’ 
perceptions in the survey. Equation (3) is then used with 
( )f
ij  modified to measure W_DoB of 
each firm board. 
Each attribute is measured as the mean score from the questionnaire survey. It is then used 
to measure the weighted diversity-in-boards index (W_DiB) for that firm. The W_DiB is 
calculated as the sum of all four ranked attributes, and each ranked attribute is multiplied by 
the mean value of importance rating obtained from the survey. A higher value represents a 
higher diversity-in-boards in that firm. 
4.6 Control variables 
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This study controls for the firm characteristics return on assets (ROA), auditors (AUDIT), 
state ownership (STATE), foreign ownership (FOREIGN), and stock exchange location 
(STOCK_EX), which have been shown to influence CSD (Cormier et al. 2011, 
Purushothaman et al. 2000, Vu et al. 2011, Vu 2012). Although CSD can vary widely across 
industries (Mahadeo et al. 2011), the study does not control for industry type because the 
business activities of most Vietnamese listed firms are conducted in multiple industry sectors, 
and at present there are no norms for distinct industry classifications of listed firms in 
Vietnam (Nguyen 2012). The description of the control variables is given in Table 5. 
4.7 Empirical models: The effects of board diversity on CSD 
The first and second hypotheses, which examine the impact of board diversity on CSD, are 
tested using the following two regression functions: 
      0 1 , vari i j i i iCSD DoB control iables  (4) 
      0 1 , vari i j i i iCSD DiB control iables  (5) 
where CSDi = firm i’s stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index; iDoB = firm i’s 
indices of diversity-of-boards; 
iDiB = firm i’s indices of diversity-in-boards; i = 1, …, n firms. 
4.8 The sample 
This study examines the 2010 annual reports to capture the quantity and quality of CSD of 
Vietnamese listed firms. The 2010 year was chosen in this study because on 15 January 2010, 
the Ministry of Finance in Vietnam issued the Circular 09/2010/TT-BT Guidance for 
Information Disclosure on Stock Exchange with the aim of providing guidance to enhance the 
disclosure practices of Vietnamese listed firms. The results of this study can help the Ministry 
of Finance form a better understanding of listed firms’ CSD practices to revise and upgrade 
this Circular for guidance on CSD. The sample was based on the 150 firms listed on the Ho 
Chi Minh stock exchange (HOSE) and Hanoi stock exchange (HNX) in 2010 that had been 
listed for the three-year period from 2008 to 2010, and that were not banks or financial 
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institutions. The three-year criterion was adopted in this study to avoid newly listed firms as 
these firms may be less representative in terms of CSD (Lim et al. 2007). The necessary data 
for board diversity, CSD, and information about control variables was hand-collected from 
the 2010 annual reports. Because annual reports proved were not to be available for 17 of 
those firms, the final sample contained 133 firms. 
The annual reports were retrieved from HOSE and HNX websites as well as firm 
websites. Firms in the finance sector operate under a tight regulatory environment and are 
subject to various other disclosure requirements. Several previous CSR studies have excluded 
finance firms when analyzing non-finance firms (Haji 2013, Haniffa and Cooke 2005). 
Hence, banks and financial institutions are excluded.  
4. Results 
Table 2 shows the response rate to the different versions of the questionnaire; the average 
response rate was 60%.  
Table 2. Response rate of target groups. 
Respondents  Distributed 
questionnaires 
Completed 
questionnaires 
Response 
rate (%) 
Local communities (society aspects) 350 243 69.43 
Customers (product aspects) 270 158 58.52 
Employees (labor aspects) 270 164 60.74 
Lawyers and regulators (human rights aspects) 190 87 45.79 
Total 1080 652 60.37 
 
Table 3 shows the score distribution of 80 executives’ perceptions regarding the attributes of 
board diversity. The mean scores vary between 5.13 (gender diversity) and 7.93 (nationality 
diversity), with the lowest being zero and the highest being 10.  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the importance rating based on executives’ 
perspectives about the board of directors’ attributes in relation to CSD. 
Importance rating Max Min Mean SD 
Structural attributes 
CEO/chair separation 10 5 7.53 1.73 
% Representative directors’ ownership 9 5 7.13 1.25 
% Promoters 10 3 6.47 1.85 
Non-executive directors owning > 5% of a firm’s equity 9 0 6.33 2.44 
Demographic attributes 
Gender diversity  8 0 5.13 2.36 
Age diversity  8 0 5.87 2.29 
Educational qualifications diversity  10 5 7.60 1.35 
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Nationality diversity  10 5 7.93 1.33 
 
5.1 Labor aspect (LA) 
Panel A of Table 4 shows the ratings awarded by employees to the various reporting items 
concerning the labor aspect (LA). The highest mean score for those reporting items is 7.47 
and the lowest is 6.44, out of a maximum possible score of 10 (column 2). In analyzing the 
disclosure types (columns 3 to 6) for the 15 reporting items (LA1 to LA15) for the labor 
aspect, employee respondents rated the highest scores, which are printed in bold in the Table, 
for items with numerical disclosures (9 items), i.e., LA2, LA3, LA15, LA4, LA5, LA7, LA9, 
LA13, and LA14, and for the reporting items with both monetary and numerical disclosures 
(6 items), i.e., LA1, LA6, LA8, LA10, LA11, and LA12. Meanwhile, the lowest scores, 
printed in italics in the table, were given to the items with monetary disclosures (11 items), 
i.e., LA2, LA3, LA15, LA4, LA5, LA7, LA8, LA9, LA12, LA13, and LA14, and the items 
with narrative disclosures (4 items), i.e., LA1, LA6, LA10, and LA11.  
5.2 Human rights (HR) aspect 
Table 4, Panel B, provides the ratings awarded by lawyers and regulators for the various 
information items on the human rights aspect (HR). The highest mean score for the 
information items is 8.19 and the lowest is 6.38 (column 2). Relating to the disclosure types 
(columns 3 to 6), out of 11 items (HR1 to HR11) in the human rights aspect, lawyers and 
regulators assigned the highest scores to the items with numerical disclosures (9 items), and to 
the items with both monetary and numerical disclosures (2 items). The items with narrative 
disclosures (10 items) and the items with monetary disclosures (1 item) received the lowest 
scores.  
5.3 Societal (SO) aspect 
Table 4, Panel C, presents the ratings assigned by the members of local communities to the 
various reporting items concerning the societal aspect (SO). The highest mean score for the 
reporting items is 7.92 and the lowest is 6.22 (column 2). Relating to the disclosure types 
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(columns 3 to 6), out of 10 items (SO1 to SO10) in the societal aspect, local communities 
assigned the highest scores for all 10 items with both monetary and numerical disclosures. 
They assigned the lowest mean scores scores to all 10 items with narrative disclosures.  
5.4 Product (PR) aspect 
Table 4, Panel D, shows the ratings awarded by customers for the various reporting items 
about the product aspect (PR).  The highest mean score for the reporting items is 8.08 and the 
lowest is 6.62 (column 2). Relating to the disclosure types (columns 3 to 6), out of 9 items 
(PR1 to PR9) in the product aspect, customers assigned the highest scores for items with both 
monetary and numerical disclosures (8 items), and one item with narrative disclosure. They 
assigned the lowest scores to the items with narrative disclosures (5 items), monetary 
disclosures (3 items), and one item with numerical disclosure. 
Table 4. List of 45 items with the mean importance weighted by four stakeholder-
specific groups for disclosure items and types, in order of relative importance.  
 
Panel A: List of 15 labor items and the mean importance weighted by employees for 
disclosure items and types. 
Labor items 
(LA) 
Mean weight of 
items disclosed 
Mean weight of each type of disclosure 
Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both monetary and 
numerical 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LA11 7.47 6.53 6.75 6.92 7.51 
LA7 7.38 6.28 6.00 7.17 7.06 
LA8 7.29 6.49 6.31 7.02 6.97 
LA4 7.28 6.22 5.99 7.19 6.92 
LA5 7.28 6.34 5.99 7.09 6.84 
LA9 7.27 6.54 6.37 7.06 6.88 
LA3 7.18 6.15 7.00 7.19 7.68 
LA2 7.15 6.03 5.85 6.92 6.69 
LA12 7.11 6.65 6.10 7.10 7.12 
LA10 7.05 6.20 6.02 6.94 6.90 
LA1 6.97 5.77 5.85 7.04 7.27 
LA14 6.78 5.84 6.35 6.74 7.16 
LA15 6.7 5.73 5.69 6.88 6.90 
LA6 6.47 5.94 5.60 6.69 6.34 
LA13 6.44 5.97 5.27 6.53 6.26 
 
Panel B: List of 11 human right items and the mean importance weighted by lawyers and regulators 
for disclosure items and types  
Human rights 
items (HR) 
Mean weight 
of items 
disclosed 
Mean weight of each type of disclosure 
Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both monetary and 
numerical 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HR7 8.19 5.27 5.90 7.90 6.64 
HR11 7.98 5.19 6.00 7.52 7.36 
HR4 7.9 5.28 5.25 7.64 6.78 
HR6 7.89 5.43 6.07 7.89 7.21 
HR5 7.28 4.91 5.23 6.99 6.32 
HK9 7.19 5.26 5.62 6.79 6.61 
HR3 7.18 4.62 5.64 7.03 6.82 
HR8 6.93 5.53 5.83 6.96 6.53 
HR10 6.71 4.87 5.17 6.45 6.41 
HR1 6.69 4.71 6.01 7.05 7.68 
HR2 6.38 4.55 5.30 6.75 6.97 
 
Panel C: List of 10 society items and the mean importance weighted by local communities for 
disclosure items and types 
Society items 
(SO) 
 
Mean weight of 
items disclosed 
Mean weight of each type of disclosure 
Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both monetary 
and numerical 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SO2 7.92 4.91 6.35 6.50 7.58 
SO8 7.81 5.49 6.98 6.99 7.90 
SO1 7.67 4.61 6.53 6.04 7.97 
SO10 7.52 5.06 5.87 6.22 7.43 
SO4 7.41 5.11 6.10 6.55 7.55 
SO7 7.35 5.45 6.12 6.36 7.38 
SO9 7.26 4.79 5.58 6.09 7.32 
SO3 7.24 5.06 5.74 6.57 7.34 
SO6 6.94 4.88 6.21 6.09 7.33 
SO5 6.22 4.88 5.46 5.73 6.44 
 
Panel D: List of 9 product items and the mean importance weighted by customers for disclosure items 
and types 
Product items 
(PR) 
Mean weight 
of items 
disclosed 
Mean weight of each type of disclosure 
Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both monetary and 
numerical 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PR1 8.08 5.22 6.14 6.58 7.68 
PR5 8.07 6.30 6.17 7.08 7.76 
PR9 7.8 5.61 6.56 6.70 8.09 
PR8 7.77 5.97 6.02 6.64 7.11 
PR3 7.71 5.88 5.43 6.09 6.74 
PR7 7.64 5.56 5.62 6.49 7.35 
PR6 6.98 6.05 5.68 5.60 5.89 
PR2 6.94 5.57 5.63 6.21 6.53 
PR2 6.62 5.59 5.28 5.57 6.13 
 
5.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5 presents  the  descriptive  statistics  for the variables used to analyze the impact of 
board diversity on CSD in the sample of 133 Vietnamese listed firms. The CSD score 
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(CSD_INDEX) ranges from 3 percent to 23 percent with a mean of 10 percent, which reveals 
that the CSD score of listed firms in the sample is low. This is because CSD practices are 
relatively new in Vietnam (Vu et al. 2011). Our result is consistent with Vu et al.’s (2011) 
examination of the quantity of voluntary disclosure, including social disclosure in Vietnam.   
UW_DoB has a range between 0.23 and 0.49, and W_DoB has a range between 0.24 and 
0.49. The mean values are 0.30 and 0.31, respectively. The range for UW_DiB is between 
zero and seven, and its mean value is 3.00. The range for W_DiB is between zero and 47.19 
and its mean value is 18.6. The mean values of UW_DiB and W_DiB indicate that diversity-
in-boards in the sample is quite low. 
Related to the control variables, only 21 (16 percent) of the 133 firms in the sample use the 
Big Four auditing firms. The mean of ROA is 0.08, which is similar to the 0.07 found by Vu 
et al. (2011) for a sample of 45 Vietnamese listed firms in 2008. The Ho Chi Minh stock 
exchange includes 90 (68 percent) of the 133 listed firms in the sample. Because foreign 
ownership is limited to 49 percent in Vietnamese listed firms governed by Vietnamese law, 
the average percentage of foreign ownership (FOREIGN) in this sample is quite low, 12 
percent, with a range of 0 to 49 percent. The average percentage of state ownership (STATE) 
is 27 percent with a range of 0 to 79.07 percent.  
Table 5. Descriptive statistics. 
Variables Mean SD Min Max P25 P50 P75 
Dependent variables 
       
CSD_INDEX 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.23 0.07 0.09 0.12 
Dependent variables – Additional analysis 
LAD_INDEX 0.17 0.08 0.03 0.41 0.12 0.18 0.22 
SOD_INDEX 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.04 0.07 
PRD_INDEX 0.16 0.05 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.14 0.20 
HRD_INDEX 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Independent variables 
       
UW_DoB 0.31 0.07 0.23 0.49 0.24 0.30 0.35 
W_DoB 0.32 0.07 0.24 0.49 0.25 0.31 0.36 
UW_DiB 2.91 1.71 0.00 7.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
W_DiB 18.75 11.27 0.00 47.19 10.26 18.60 26.94 
Structural attributes of the board of directors to construct DoB_Index 
CEO/chair separation 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
% Representative directors’ 
ownership 
0.22 0.23 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.19 0.40 
% Promoters 0.13 0.20 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.20 
Non-executive directors owning > 5% 
of a firm’s equity 
0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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 Demographic attributes of the board of directors measured by the modified Blau’s index to construct DiB_Index 
Gender diversity  0.38 0.38 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.49 0.64 
Age diversity  0.64 0.20 0.00 0.92 0.59 0.70 0.80 
Educational qualifications diversity  0.41 0.26 0.00 0.93 0.29 0.43 0.64 
Nationality diversity  0.08 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Control variables 
       
AUDIT 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ROA 0.08 0.08 -0.17 0.39 0.03 0.07 0.11 
STOCK_EX 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
FOREIGN 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.49 0.02 0.05 0.17 
STATE 0.27 0.21 0.00 0.79 0.07 0.28 0.50 
The final sample consists of 133 firms listed on HOSE and HNX for 2010. CSD_INDEX = the stakeholder-
driven, three-dimensional CSD index; UW_DoB = the unweighted index of diversity-of-boards; W_DoB = the 
weighted index of diversity-of-boards; UW_DiB = the unweighted index of diversity-in-boards; W_DiB = the 
weighted index of diversity-in-boards; AUDIT = 1 if firm’s auditor is a Big Four and otherwise 0; ROA = net 
profit over the total assets; STOCK_EX = 1  if  the  firms listed  on  HOSE  and 0  for  firms  listed  on  HNX; 
FOREIGN = the percentage of shareholding owned by foreign investors; STATE = the percentage of 
shareholding owned by the state. 
 
Table 6 shows the pairwise correlations between all combinations of variables. UW_DoB 
and W_DoB are positively correlated with a coefficient of 0.997, and  UW_DiB is positively 
correlated with W_DiB (r = 0.988). This study therefore undertakes the task of empirically 
confirming whether UW_DoB and W_DoB, or UW_DiB and W_DiB, have a similar 
influence on CSD. As expected, the two measures of UW_DiB and W_DiB are positively 
correlated with CSD_INDEX (coefficients of 0.264 and 0.258, respectively), while both 
UW_DoB and W_DoB show no significant correlations.  
Table 6. Pairwise correlations. 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 CSD_INDEX 1.000 
         
2 UW_DoB 0.140 1.000 
        
3 W_DoB 0.147 0.997 1.000 
       
4 UW_DiB 0.264 -0.036 -0.035 1.000 
      
5 W_DiB 0.258 -0.036 -0.037 0.988 1.000 
     
6 AUDIT 0.286 0.145 0.152 0.011 0.042 1.000 
    
7 ROA 0.183 -0.059 -0.051 0.062 0.054 0.045 1.000 
   
8 STOCK_EX 0.344 0.078 0.077 0.199 0.201 0.167 0.108 1.000 
  
9 FOREIGN 0.187 -0.049 -0.051 0.204 0.238 0.221 0.450 0.365 1.000 
 
10 STATE -0.049 0.015 0.026 -0.374 -0.371 0.179 0.099 -0.250 -0.179 1.000 
*Bold text indicates significance at the 10% level or better. Please see note below Table 5 for description of each 
variable.
 
Although UW_DoB is significantly positively correlated with CSD_INDEX with a coefficient of 0.147, 
the p-value is 0.092 (not tabulated). 
 
5.6 Checking  for multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity 
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This study checks the variance inflation factor (VIF) for the regression analysis and finds that 
the maximum VIF is 1.59, which is less than 10, for all the regression models. Therefore, 
multicollinearity does not influence the empirical models tested in this study (Gujarati and 
Porter 2009). To avoid the problem of heteroscedasticity (where observations have variable 
residual values), robust standard error (White 1980) is employed to investigate the impact of 
board diversity indices (UW_DoB, W_DoB, UW_DiB, and W_DiB) on CSD (CSD_INDEX). 
5.7 Results of hypothesis tests  
Table 7 provides the findings of the tests of hypotheses 1 and 2 where CSD_INDEX is the 
dependent variable, and UW_DoB, W_DoB, UW_DiB, and W_DiB are the alternate 
independent variables. The table shows that both UW_DoB and W_DoB are not related to 
CSD_INDEX (p-values of 0.318 and 0.298 respectively), which rejects hypothesis 1.  
Meanwhile, the coefficient estimates of both UW_DiB and W_DiB are positive and 
significant (p-values of 0.010 and 0.014, respectively), indicating that firms with greater 
diversity-in-boards have a positive influence on higher CSD, confirming hypothesis 2. 
Table 7. Board diversity (unweighted and weighted indices) and CSD.  
 
CSD_INDEX CSD_INDEX CSD_INDEX CSD_INDEX 
UW_DoB 0.057 
   
 
(0.318) 
   
W_DoB 
 
0.062 
  
  
(0.298) 
  
UW_DiB 
  
0.006*** 
 
   
(0.010) 
 
W_DiB 
   
0.001** 
    
(0.014) 
AUDIT 0.030** 0.030** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005) 
ROA 0.101** 0.100** 0.093* 0.097* 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.072) (0.062) 
STOCK_EX 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
FOREIGN -0.017 -0.017 -0.026 -0.029 
 
(0.605) (0.612) (0.400) (0.352) 
STATE -0.010 -0.011 0.006 0.005 
 
(0.568) (0.563) (0.742) (0.786) 
Constant 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 
 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
R
2
 0.204 0.205 0.238 0.233 
Adj- R
2
 0.166 0.167 0.201 0.197 
F statistic 6.29*** 6.33*** 6.82*** 6.76*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Mean VIF 1.26 1.26 1.31 1.31 
The p-values are in parentheses, calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. Statistical 
significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. Please see note below Table 5 for description 
of each variable. 
 
The results for the control variables shown in Table 6 illustrate a positive and significant 
association (p-values < 0.05) between AUDIT and CSD_INDEX, which suggests that firms 
audited by the Big Four auditing firms tend to make more CSD, which is consistent with prior 
studies (Craswell 1992, Inchausti 1997, Uwuigbe and Egbide 2012). ROA shows positive and 
significant coefficients (p-values < 0.10), which suggests that firms that perform better 
financially are associated with more CSD, which is consistent with the literature (Khan et al. 
2013, Lu and Abeysekera 2014, Haniffa and Cooke 2005). The STOCK_EX is positively and 
significantly (p-values < 0.01) associated with CSD_INDEX, which indicates that firms listed 
on HOSE engage in significantly higher CSD than firms listed on HNX. This is consistent 
with Vu (2012) who examines the factors impacting on voluntary disclosure in Vietnamese 
listed firms. FOREIGN and STATE are not significantly related to CSD, as in prior studies 
(Haniffa and Cooke 2005, Lu and Abeysekera 2014). 
5. Additional analysis and robustness tests 
6.1 Board diversity and corporate social disclosure across four social aspects 
To provide further insight, this study analyses the relationships between board diversity and 
CSD across four social aspects in the GRI 3.1 framework. These are labor practices, human 
rights, society, and product responsibility. As is shown in Table 5, information related to labor 
practices (LAD_INDEX) and product responsibility (PRD_INDEX) items is disclosed the 
most, with a mean value of 0.17 and 0.16, respectively. A minimum score of 0 for society 
(SOD_INDEX) and human rights (HRD_INDEX) aspects suggests that some firms do not 
disclose any information about their society and human rights aspects; in fact, of the 133 
firms in the sample, only 18 firms (13.5%) disclose the human rights aspect, 74 firms (55.6%) 
25 
 
disclose the society aspect, while all firms (133 firms or 100%) in the sample disclose the 
labor and product responsibility aspects. 
Following Firth (1979) in omitting firms which definitely do not have any items to 
disclose, this study examines the impact of board diversity on society aspect disclosure for 
only the 74 listed firms that disclose the society aspect, whereas it assesses the impact of 
board diversity on labor aspect disclosure and on product responsibility aspect disclosure for 
133 listed firms (full sample). Because only 18 firms disclose the human rights aspect, which 
does not provide an adequate sample size for regression modeling, the human rights 
disclosure aspect is not analyzed here. The regression is repeated by replacing CSD_INDEX 
in the models reported in Table 7 with the score of each of three aspects, i.e., labor practices 
(LAD_INDEX), product responsibility (PRD_INDEX), and society (SOD_INDEX) as the 
dependent variable. Because almost identical results are obtained by using either the 
unweighted or weighted index to measure board diversity, for brevity this study only presents 
the results using weighted indices of diversity-of-boards and diversity-in-boards. Other results 
are available upon request. 
Table 8 shows that the regression results are consistent with the results of CSD_INDEX 1 
reported in Table 7. The results for the disclosure of labor practices (LAD_INDEX), product 2 
responsibility (PRD_INDEX), and society (SOD_INDEX) indicate that diversity-of-boards 3 
(W_DoB) does not significantly influence the defined aspects of social disclosure. The 4 
diversity-in-boards (W_DiB) significantly (p-values < 0.05) and positively influences the 5 
defined aspects of social disclosure.  6 
Table 8. Board diversity and CSD across three social aspects 7 
 
LAD_INDEX LAD_INDEX PRD_INDEX PRD_INDEX SOD_INDEX SOD_INDEX 
W_DoB 0.069 
 
0.007 
 
0.073 
 
 
(0.508) 
 
(0.920) 
 
(0.317) 
 
W_DiB 
 
0.001** 
 
0.001** 
 
0.001*** 
  
(0.049) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.004) 
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AUDIT 0.026 0.025 0.035** 0.034** 0.010 0.009 
 
(0.178) (0.157) (0.013) (0.022) (0.430) (0.478) 
ROA 0.164* 0.159* 0.077 0.074 0.130 0.128 
 
(0.070) (0.078) (0.143) (0.161) (0.137) (0.103) 
STOCK_EX 0.028* 0.027* 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 
 
(0.059) (0.051) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) 
FOREIGN 0.016 -0.001 -0.033 -0.043 -0.023 -0.036 
 
(0.778) (0.992) (0.352) (0.244) (0.590) (0.368) 
STATE -0.008 0.015 -0.026 -0.009 -0.003 0.018 
 
(0.807) (0.641) (0.255) (0.703) (0.918) (0.519) 
Constant 0.112*** 0.107*** 0.131*** 0.113*** 0.016 0.015 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.555) (0.400) 
R
2
 0.101 0.123 0.176 0.208 0.137 0.212 
Adjusted R
2
 0.058 0.081 0.137 0.170 0.059 0.142 
F statistic 2.48** 2.95*** 5.64*** 7.18*** 3.06*** 3.21*** 
p-value 0.027 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.008 
Obs  133 133 133 133 74 74 
The p-values are in parentheses, calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. Statistical 8 
significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. Please see below Table 5 for description of 9 
each variable. 10 
6.2 Alternative regression specifications 11 
In the primary analysis, this study measures diversity-in-boards indices (both weighted and 12 
unweighted) through the terciles split method. An additional analysis is carried out to ensure 13 
that the primary analysis is robust, and this study tests diversity-in-boards and CSD models by 14 
using median and quartile values alternately to measure diversity-in-boards indices. These 15 
values are used to rank firms’ levels of diversity-in-boards (Ben-Amar et al. 2013, Hafsi and 16 
Turgut 2013), and those ranks become the diversity-in-board observed in firms. Specifically, 17 
the median split method categorizes each demographic attribute into two groups, taking 1 if 18 
every value is above the median, otherwise 0. The quartile split method categorizes each 19 
demographic attribute into four groups, taking 0 for the first quartile (below 25%), 1 for the 20 
second quartile (between 25.1% and 50%), 2 for the third quartile (between 51% and 75%), 21 
and 3 for the fourth quartile (above 75%). Those results are similar and more significant in the 22 
median split method (Table 9). In addition, the results are cross checked using the return on 23 
equity (ROE), which measures financial performance, instead of ROA, and the results do not 24 
change (Table 9).  25 
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Table 9. Diversity-in-boards (median and quartile split methods) and CSD  26 
 
CSD_INDEX CSD_INDEX CSD_INDEX CSD_INDEX 
UW_DiB (median split method) 0.010*** 
   
 
(0.008) 
   
W_DiB (median split method) 
 
0.002*** 
  
  
(0.010) 
  
UW_DiB (quartile split method) 
  
0.004*** 
 
   
(0.010) 
 
W_DiB (quartile split method) 
   
0.001** 
    
(0.018) 
AUDIT 0.028*** 0.027** 0.027** 0.027** 
 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) 
ROE 0.058** 0.058** 0.053** 0.053** 
 
(0.030) (0.028) (0.046) (0.047) 
STOCK_EX 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FOREIGN -0.018 -0.021 -0.020 -0.022 
 
(0.589) (0.534) (0.540) (0.520) 
STATE 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.009 
 
(0.664) (0.653) (0.579) (0.626) 
Constant 0.013 0.013 0.034** 0.037** 
 
(0.571) (0.575) (0.036) (0.024) 
R
2
 0.2362 0.2355 0.236 0.2295 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1998 0.1991 0.1996 0.1928 
F statistic 7.01*** 6.99*** 6.63*** 6.53*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean VIF 1.25 1.25 1.27 1.28 
The p-values are in parentheses, calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. Statistical 27 
significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. Please see below Table 5 for description of 28 
each variable. 29 
6. Discussion 30 
The results are consistent with an earlier study by Hafsi and Turgut (2013) who report a 31 
positive association between diversity-in-boards and social performance and find no such 32 
relationship between diversity-of-boards and social performance. Additionally, it has been 33 
shown elsewhere that the structural attributes of a board such as outside directors (Haniffa and 34 
Cooke 2002, Hossain and Reaz 2007, Michelon and Parbonetti 2012), board leadership 35 
structure (Barako et al. 2006, Haniffa and Cooke 2002, Khan et al. 2013, Michelon and 36 
Parbonetti 2012), and directors’ ownership (Hafsi and Turgut 2013) do not affect voluntary 37 
disclosure or social and environmental disclosure. Based on agency theory, diversity-of-38 
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boards is identified with structural attributes and therefore represents the recommended 39 
governance ‘best practices’. Structural attributes of the board can help to align managers’ 40 
interests with shareholders’ interests (Fama 1980, Fama and Jensen 1983). Thus, diversity-of-41 
boards may have only an indirect influence on social disclosure (Hafsi and Turgut 2013).  42 
Also, prior studies document a positive relationship between disclosure (such as social 43 
and environmental disclosure or voluntary disclosure) and demographic attributes of the 44 
board of directors such as gender diversity (Bear et al. 2010, Fernandez-Feijoo et al. 2012, 45 
Post et al. 2011) and education diversity (Akhtaruddin and Abdur  Rouf 2011). Based on 46 
resource dependence theory, members of the board of directors are key strategic resources for 47 
an organization and contribute to CSD. The demographic differences of directors are likely to 48 
support an organization’s external legitimacy and to enhance the relations between the 49 
organization and relevant stakeholders, and therefore diversity-in-boards has a positive impact 50 
on CSD. 51 
 52 
7. Implications 53 
8.1 Implications for theory 54 
The board of directors provides two key functions: it monitor managers’ discretion on behalf 55 
of the shareholders, as underpinned by agency theory, and provides important resources to the 56 
firm, as underpinned by resource dependency theory (Hillman and Dalziel 2003, Jackling and 57 
Johl 2009). The findings in this study show that the impact of diversity-of-boards on CSD is 58 
not supported by agency theory, while resource dependency theory supports the impact of 59 
diversity-in-boards on CSD. 60 
8.2 Implications for methodology 61 
Previous studies have mostly considered the individual attributes of the demographic or/and 62 
structural attributes of boards when examining their diversity. Those studies seldom combine 63 
the attributes. Two studies (Ben-Amar et al. 2013, Hafsi and Turgut 2013) combine the 64 
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demographic attributes into a demographic diversity index, and the structural attributes into a 65 
structural diversity index. They assume that all the attributes are equally important. This study 66 
however makes no such assumptions. It first examines the attributes by assuming that they are 67 
all equally important (unweighted), and then examines the attributes by including firms’ 68 
executives’ perceptions about each of the attributes (weighted). A questionnaire provides 69 
executives’ perceptions on various attributes relating to board diversity to determine their 70 
importance. A comparison of results between weighted and unweighted methods enables the 71 
potential impact of the perceived importance of attributes relating to the diversity-in-boards 72 
and diversity-of-boards and their relationships with CSD to be investigated. 73 
Additionally, mainstream research has also focused on the quantity of disclosure 74 
measured by a dichotomous score (Ho and Wong 2001, Vu 2012, Xiao and Yuan 2007). Little 75 
empirical evidence measures the disclosure quality or measures the combined disclosure 76 
quantity and disclosure quality (Haji 2013). This study extends the literature by constructing a 77 
CSD index that combines disclosure quantity and two aspects of disclosure quality perceived 78 
by four socially relevant stakeholder groups, rather than managers or miscellaneous 79 
stakeholder perspectives (Haji 2013, McNally et al. 1982, Saleh et al. 2010). 80 
8.3 Implications for practice 81 
Based on the survey of different stakeholders, the findings of this study benefit a range of 82 
interest groups. Corporate executives, who take charge of preparing CSD, can find the results 83 
useful in ascertaining how much and what social information to disclose to stakeholders. The 84 
results also demonstrate the current CSD practices of Vietnamese listed firms and 85 
stakeholders’ perceptions about CSD. Regulators will benefit from a better understanding of 86 
Vietnamese firms’ CSD practices, to improve the current guidelines on the CSD of 87 
Vietnamese listed firms, issued on 15 January 2010 by the Ministry of Finance in its Circular  88 
“Guidance for Information Disclosure on Stock Exchange.” The year used in the study, 2010, 89 
was specifically chosen to best fit this purpose. Although the sample size used in this study is 90 
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just 133 firms, which appears small in the context of large western stock exchanges, in the 91 
smaller Vietnamese stock exchange context it is in fact representative.  92 
8. Conclusions  93 
Investigating the influence of board diversity on CSD of 133 Vietnamese listed firms in 2010, 94 
the findings reject the first hypothesis, that higher diversity-of-boards leads to higher CSD, 95 
showing that diversity-of-boards indices (both unweighted and weighted) do not significantly 96 
influence the CSD index. Meanwhile, the results support hypothesis 2 which states that 97 
greater diversity-in-boards leads to higher CSD. This study also confirmed that weighted and 98 
unweighted board diversity indices had a similar influence on CSD. Although no prior studies 99 
build weighted and unweighted board diversity indices to make a comparison with this study, 100 
other studies that construct both weighted and unweighted disclosure indices in corporate 101 
disclosure research also find no significant differences between these two indices (Barako et 102 
al. 2006, Chow and Wong-Boren 1987, Haji 2013). 103 
Annual reports are exclusively focused on in this study because they are considered to be 104 
firms’ most important public communication document. However, social disclosures could 105 
also be provided in other ways such as press releases, the media, and the Internet, hence 106 
future studies could explore the roles of other disclosure channels to examine firms’ CSD.  107 
Appendix.  108 
Method of measuring unweighted diversity-of-boards index (UW_DoB) 109 
First, the dissimilarity between a given firm and another firm is measured using a 110 
mathematical distance function defined by Han and Kamber (2006) as follows: 111 
 







( ) ( )
1
( )
1
( , )
p f f
ij ijf
p f
ijf
d
d i j
  
(6) 112 
where d(i, j) is the dissimilarity between objects i and j (i.e., firm i and firm j); p is 113 
represented as the number of structural attributes of the firm board examined in this study. 114 
These two data points are represented as (xi1, xi2, …, xip) and (xj1, xj2, …, xjp) respectively. 115 
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The indicator = 1 with the assumption that attributes f is equal weighted relative to the 116 
contribution. 117 
 118 
Then, the contribution made by an attribute f to the dissimilar function between firm i and 119 
firm j (i.e., ) is calculated. However, that computation is unique to each data type. As 120 
attributes are measured using different data types,  is calculated using different formulas 121 
based on the data type of the attribute. The structural attributes of boards in this paper contain 122 
binary and ratio scale data types, so the following formulas focus on these two data types: 123 
 124 
(a). If attribute f is binary: = 0 if xif = xjf, or otherwise = 1; 125 
(b). If attribute f is ratio scale, it is treated like an interval scale attribute with the following 126 
formula: 127 
where h runs over all non-missing objects for attribute f. 128 
The contribution of dissimilarity for all the different attributes (i.e., ) is normalized by 129 
these formulates, and hence expresses on a common scale from 0 to 1. The average distance 130 
(dissimilarity) to all the other boards is taken as follows (note that 1 is subtracted from the 131 
number of firms in the sample in the denominator of the formula because this study compares 132 
a firm with other firms without the firm being compared with itself, because such a 133 
comparison is meaningless): 134 
 

 1 ( , )( )
1
k
j
d i j
D i
k
  (7) 135 
where k is the number of firm boards; D(i) is the average dissimilarity of firm board i to all 136 
other boards in the sample, namely UW_DoB of each firm board.  137 
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An example of an unweighted diversity-of-boards index’s calculation with four firms’ 138 
data 139 
Firm board CEO/chairperson 
separation 
(binary) 
Representative 
directors’ 
ownership (%) 
(ratio scale ) 
% Promoters 
(ratio scale ) 
Non-executive 
directors owning 
> 5% of a firm’s 
equity 
(binary) 
Firm Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4 
1 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0.5726 0.6 0 
3 0 0 0.25 0 
4 0 0.1217 0.4 1 
The dissimilarity function between firm i and firm j (i.e., ) for each attribute f is computed 140 
in the dissimilarity matrix as follows: 141 
( )
1,2
( ) ( )
1,3 2,3
( ) ( ) ( )
1,4 2,4 3,4
0
0
0
0
f
f f
f f f
d
d d
d d d
 
 
 
 
 
 
 142 
Binary scale data types (Attribute 1 and attribute 4) 143 
Because attributes 1 and 4 are binary,  becomes 0 if the attributes of firm board i and firm 144 
board j match, and 1 if the attributes differ. This study gained  for attribute 1 (i.e. 
(1)
,i jd ) in 145 
the dissimilarity matrix as follows. 146 
 147 
This study gained  for attribute 4 (i.e. 
(4)
,i jd ) in the dissimilarity matrix as follows: 148 
( )f
ijd
( )f
ijd
( )f
ijd
0
1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0 0
 
 
 
 
 
 
( )f
ijd
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 149 
 150 
Ratio scale data types (Attribute 2 and attribute 3) 151 
This illustration computes  for attributes 2 and 3 (which are ratio scales). In this scenario, 152 
the data of each attribute is treated like an interval scale (see b) for the formula). To compute 153 
 for attribute 2 (i.e. (2)
,i jd ), this study let maxhxh = 0.5726 and minhxh = 0. The following 154 
dissimilarity matrix is then obtained for attribute 2 (i.e. (2)
,i jd ): 155 
 156 
The figures shown in column 1 of the matrix for attribute 2 above (that is 0, 1, 0, 0.21) are 157 
calculated as follows. 158 
The dissimality score for attribute 2 for firm 1 compared with firm 1: 159 
 (because there is no dissimilarity between firm 1 and itself). 160 
The dissimality score for attribute 2 for firm 1 compared with firm 2: 161 
 162 
The dissimality score for attribute 2 for firm 1 compared with firm 3: 163 
 164 
The dissimality score for attribute 2 for firm 1 compared with firm 4: 165 
 166 
0
0 0
0 0 0
1 1 1 0
 
 
 
 
 
 
( )f
ijd
( )f
ijd
0
1 0
0 1 0
0.21 0.79 0.21 0
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2)1,1 0d

 

(2)
1,2
0 0.5726
1
0.5726 0
d

 

(2)
1,3
0 0
0
0.5726 0
d

 

(2)
1,4
0 0.1217
0.21
0.5726 0
d
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Attribute 3 is also a ratio scale. As with calculating attribute 2, the  for attribute 3 (i.e. 
(3)
,i jd167 
) in the dissimilarity matrix is as follows (details of calculating individual figures are not 168 
shown here): 169 
 170 
 171 
The dissimilarity matrices for the four attributes are computed using formula (1). For 172 
example, the dissimilarity between firm 1 and firm 4 (d(1,4)), for the combined four 173 
attributes, is obtained as follows (all four attributes are assumed to have equal weights, hence 174 
the indicator is 1): 175 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1,4 1,4 1,4 1,41* 1* 1* 1* 1*0 1*0.21 1*0.67 1*1
(1,4) 0.47
4 4
d d d d
d
     
    176 
 177 
Similarly, the resulting dissimilarity matrix obtained for the data described by the four 178 
attributes of mixed types is: 179 
 180 
 181 
Finally, the diversity-of-boards index of each firm board is calculated based on formula (2), 182 
which is the average difference of a given firm with all other firms when the dissimilarity 183 
distance is measured.  184 
For example, the UW_DoB of firm board 1 is: 185 
. 186 
 187 
( )f
ijd
0
1 0
0.42 0.58 0
0.67 0.33 0.25 0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ( )fij
0 0
(1,2) 0 0.75 0
(1,3) (2,3) 0 0.10 0.65 0
(1,4) (2,4) (3,4) 0 0.47 0.78 0.37 0
d
d d
d d d
   
   
   
   
   
   
(1,1) (1,2) (1,3) (1,4) 0 0.75 0.1 0.47
( 1) 0.44
4 1 4 1
d d d d
D firm
     
  
 
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Similarly, by using the above computations, the UW_DoB of firm board two, three, and four 188 
are 0.73, 0.37, and 0.54, respectively. These results indicate that firm board 2 is the most 189 
diverse  (dissimilarity), while firm board 3 is the least diverse  (dissimilarity). 190 
191 
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